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³7KH3DUDGLVHRIWKH/DWULQH´American Toilet-Building and the Continuities of Colonial 
and Postcolonial Development 
 
 
Abstract: This article examines the Sanitary Hamlet Program, a rural health project to 
serve counterinsurgency goals in wartime Vietnam. The program focused on ending 
open-air defecation and instructing Vietnamese in the correct use of latrines. It situates 
this story within a larger arc of American nation-building cum toilet-building at home and 
abroad in the 20th Century. In doing so, the article reveals that American toilet-building 
shared common features and served common functions from the age of formal empire to 
the postcolonial era. Looking beyond the rhetoric of modernization to on-the-ground 
practices reveals the ways in which American approaches to international development 
after 1945 continued to be shaped by racialized perceptions of foreign peoples. But the 
project was not simply the product of an American neo-colonial impulse. It was also an 
H[SUHVVLRQRI6RXWK9LHWQDPHVHOHDGHUV¶SRVWFRORQLDOZRUOGYLHZRQHZKLFKWDUJHWHG
unsanitary peasants for hygienic reform. 
 
At the August 1961 launch of the Alliance IRU3URJUHVV$)3WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶
modernization program for Latin America, Che Guevara launched a scathing attack on American 
imperialism. Addressing the assembled Latin American dignitaries, Guevara condemned the 
AFP as nothing but a U.S. VFKHPHWRXQGHUPLQH&XED¶V revolutionary role in Latin America and 
to perpetuate Latin American dependence on the United States. In denouncing the AFP, Guevara 
chose to critique what he perceived to be a uniquely American approach to international 
development. The United States, he suggested, promised only ³Whe paradise of the latrine.´ It 
seemed the United States ZDV³thinking of making the latrine the fundamental WKLQJ´ to improve 
the social conditions of the poor. Indeed, national economic planning amounted to nothing more 
than the planning of latrines. Only once the United States had taught the poor how to be clean 
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could they enjR\WKHEHQHILWVRISURGXFWLRQ³,WLVDELWOLNH«,GRQRt know,´PXVHGGuevara, 
³but I would almost classify it as a colonial mentality.´1  
Che Guevara was not alone among the famous anti-colonialists of the Twentieth Century 
in identifying the links between sanitation and colonial rule. For Frantz Fanon, the colonial 
VWDWH¶VXVHRImedical science was part of a larger system of oppression, because the visit of the 
doctor was usually accompanied by the visit of thHDUP\³The statistics on sanitary 
improvements,´)DQRQQRWHG³are not interpreted by the native as progress in the fight against 
illness« but as fresh proof of the extension of the RFFXSLHU¶VKROGRQWKHFRXQWU\.´7KH³QDWLYH´ 
recognized the value of some of thHVHFRORQLDOLQWHUYHQWLRQVEXW³this good faith is immediately 
taken advantage of by the occupier and transformed into justification for the occupation.´ Fanon 
argued that this situation was radically transformed in the areas liberated by the Front de 
Libération National in Algeria+HUH³the problems of hygiene and of prevention of disease were 
approached in a remarkably creative atmosphere. The latrines recommended by the colonial 
administration had not been accepted in the mechtas but they were now installed in great 
numbers. Ideas on the transmission of intestinal parasites were immediately assimilated by the 
people.´2 
Were Guevara and Fanon correct? Did sanitation amount to a form of colonial or 
neocolonial social control or was it a benevolent humanitarian intervention? Was Guevara right 
to suggest that this was a particularly American phenomenon in the middle of the 20th century? 
Fanon was correct to note that many postcolonial states appropriated these colonial projects upon 
 
7KHDXWKRUZRXOGOLNHWRWKDQN7DQ\D+DUPHUIRUGLUHFWLQJKLVDWWHQWLRQWR&KH*XHYDUD¶VLQWHUHVWLQODWULQHV6WXDUW
Schrader, members of the NYU Gallatin 6FKRRO¶V86LQWKH:RUOGUHDGLQJJURXSDQGWKHDQRQ\PRXVUHYLHZHUVDW
Modern American History. 
1 &KH*XHYDUD³(FRQRPLFV&DQQRWEH6HSDUDWHGIURP3ROLWLFV,´6SHHFKDW3XQWDGHO(VWH$XJXVW 8, 1961, accessed 
June 13, 2018, https://www.marxists.org/archive/guevara/1961/08/08.htm. 
2 Frantz Fanon, A Dying Colonialism (New York: Grove Press, 1965), 122-143. 
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independence, but was it true that these reforms were then embraced by their citizens? Ruth 
Rogaski has noted that historians of modern ELRPHGLFLQHDQGSXEOLFKHDOWK³have faced two 
DQDO\WLFDOSDWKVHLWKHULWEULQJVWKHGHVLUDEOHEHQHILWVRIKHDOWKDQGPRGHUQLW\«RULWLVDPRGH
of social control, a coercive force, which, in creating modernity, limits the range of possible 
expressions of humanity.´ There is no reason, Rogaski suggests, why it cannot be both.3 Health 
education and improved sanitation are unquestionably positive development goals but they can 
also manifest as modes of social control and regulation. Public health systems give states 
HQRUPRXVSRZHUWRLQWHUYHQHLQDQGUHJXODWHWKHLUFLWL]HQV¶SULYDWHOLYHV:KLOHmany 
development projects enter the workplace, public health projects enter the home and in many 
postcolonial settings public health systems allowed new states to build new citizens. In the name 
of extending health care into the countryside in ways that colonial states had never attempted, 
governments could create the kind of modern citizens that they wanted by determining the way 
people should cook, eat, clean, dispose of waste, defecate, and reproduce. Such projects were as 
PXFKDERXWVWDNLQJWKHVWDWH¶VFODLPRQWKHSRSXODWLRQDQGHVWDEOLVKLQJWKHZULWVRYHUHLJQW\DQG
legitimacy of the postcolonial state in rural areas, as they were about giving citizens a better 
standard of life. Thus, it is no surprise that in the years after independence, peasant populations 
VRPHWLPHVDFFHSWHGDQGVRPHWLPHVUHVLVWHGWKHSRVWFRORQLDOVWDWH¶VKHDOWKLQWHUYHQWLRQV 
This paper examines the Sanitary Hamlet Program in Vietnam, a joint South Vietnamese-
U.S. effort to improve rural health and serve the goals of counterinsurgency during the final 
years of the Vietnam War. The project focused on health education, clean water and, in 
particular, latrine construction. However, I argue that this project must be situated within a much 
 
3 5XWK5RJDVNL³9DPSLUHVLQ3ODJXHODQGWKH0XOWLSOH0HDQLQJVRIWeisheng in Manchuria,´ in Health and 
Hygiene in Chinese East Asia: Policies and Publics in the Long Twentieth Century, eds. Angela Ki Che Leung and 
Charlotte Furth (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 156. 
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larger sweep of American engagement in toilet-building at home and abroad from the 1900s to 
the 1970s. In doing so, I highlight the continuities in American approaches to international 
development from the age of formal empire to the postcolonial era, not only in rhetoric but also 
in on-the-ground practices, as well as the blurred lines between domestic and foreign 
development strategies.  
An exploration of American toilet building projects in the 20th century reveals four common 
themes. These projects occurred in often starkly different geographical and temporal settings and 
political, economic, or social contexts. Technologies changed, as did American ideas that 
vulnerability and resistance to disease were racially determined. And yet these themes hold 
steady. Firstly, reformers employed hygiene as a marker of difference between themselves and 
the targets of reform. In the colonial context, WKHXQVDQLWDU\KDELWVRIWKH³QDWLYHV´VHUYHGWR 
establish hierarchies of race and legitimize colonial rule. In the domestic context, poor sanitation 
provided the basis for casting the U.S. south and southerners as problematic and diseased. Both 
populations were in need of modernization. In both colonial and postcolonial settings, hygiene 
became a symbol of difference between the new modernizing elites, in whom the United States 
often found willing collaborators, DQGWKHLU³EDFNZDUG´ citizens. A second feature was the notion 
that hygienic behavior would produce politically docile and economically productive 
populations. 'XULQJWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶FRORQLDOZDUVDQGSRVWFRORQLDOFRXQWHU-insurgencies, 
health education and sanitation served as a disciplinary force, a tool for pacifying civilians and 
mobilizing resources. By attacking the diseases which led to losses in productivity, sanitation 
projects at home and abroad would raise the targets of reform out of economic backwardness to 
produce efficient and virtuous citizens. Thirdly, from exhibits of sanitary houses in the 
Philippines to school toilets as beacons of hygiene in the US South, sanitation was frequently 
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propagated through models to be replicated by the targets of reform. Such models represented a 
snapshot of the sanitary future and allowed reformers to produce the future on a manageable 
scale. However, these models were often all that remained at the end of such interventions, and 
sometimes in less than tip-top shape. Finally, health education and sanitation seemed to allow for 
the creation of eventually healthy, self-governing citizens. Once the targets of reform had been 
taught, the state or non-state actor providing health education or sanitary facilities could retreat 
from its responsibilities. Reformers hoped, or at least claimed, that limited interventions would 
have profound consequences, laying the ground for long-term, sustainable behavior and 
infrastructures. And yet, these limited interventions, combined with the degradation of models 
over time and resistance from the targets of reform, gave these projects a decidedly performative 
sheen. Reformers generally concluded with disappointment that the targets of reform could not 
overcome their hygienic backwardness. This article demonstrates how these themes featured in 
American toilet-building ventures at home and abroad during the 20th century, before examining 
how they played out in wartime Vietnam. 
The Sanitary Hamlet Program reveals the continued linkages Americans drew between 
sanitation and pacification across the colonial and postcolonial eras. But the program also reveals 
how some postcolonial leaders perpetuated the discourse of the unsanitary subject after 
independence and, as Fanon noted, continued to implement projects which reflected their 
FRORQLDOSUHGHFHVVRUV¶DVVXPSWLRQV about hygiene and social control. This might appear 
unsurprising in the case of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), sometimes dismissed as an 
instrument of U.S. power. Undoubtedly the RVN, though free from formal imperial control, was 
under pervasive American influence. But U.S. policy makers could not choreograph South 
Vietnamese politics according to their wishes. Nation-building projects were the outcome of U.S. 
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DQG591SROLF\PDNHUV¶VRPHWLPHV conflicting, sometimes converging, and sometimes 
compromising development visions. In the Sanitary Hamlet Program, WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶
sanitizing mission coalesced with the modernizing vision of postcolonial RVN elites. These 
elites embraced some of the assumptions of the colonial state, but the program was also the 
product of RVN leaders¶ particularist views of rural modernity. 
 
(Com)Modes of Intervention: Colonialism, Philanthropy, and Latrine Construction 
Historians of international development and the history of medicine have identified two 
major themes in Cold War era global public health: disease eradication and population planning. 
Disease eradication programs had their origins in localized projects in the interwar years, but 
WRRNRQDJOREDOGLPHQVLRQDIWHU7KH:RUOG+HDOWK2UJDQL]DWLRQ¶VSUHIHUence for top-
down technical interventions and emphasis on worker productivity, combined with postcolonial 
OHDGHUV¶GHVLUHVWRRYHUFRPHWKHIDLOXUHVRIFRORQLDOPHGLFLQH led to global efforts to eradicate 
malaria, smallpox, and other diseases. Deploying technological rather than disciplinary solutions 
allowed the WHO to intervene on a largescale, without tackling thorny and locally specific 
cultural or social issues. The results of these efforts were mixed. By 1980, the WHO could 
declare that smallpox had been eliminated, but the organization had long since abandoned its 
efforts to eradicate malaria. In any case, technocratic fears in the 1960s and 1970s that 
improvements in public health in the Third World ZHUHSULPLQJD³SRSXODWLRQERPE,´ shifted the 
focus of global public health to increasingly coercive population growth control programs.4  
 
4 Sunil Amrith, Decolonizing International Health: India and Southeast Asia, 1930-1965 (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2006), 12-17; Alison Bashford, Global Population: History, Geopolitics, and Life on Earth (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2014); Matthew Connelly, Fatal Misconception: the Struggle to Control World 
Population, (CambULGJH+DUYDUG8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV(UH]0DQHOD³$3R[RQ<RXU1DUUDWLYH:ULWLQJ
Disease Control into Cold War History,´Diplomatic History 34, no. 2 (2010): 299-323; Randall M. Packard, 
³0DODULD'UHDPV3RVWZDU9LVLRQVRI+HDOWKDQG'HYHORSPHQWLQWhe Third World,´Medical Anthropology 17, no. 3 
(1997): 279-296. 
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In examining these two technocentric global health regimes, historians have overlooked a 
third theme. Like disease eradication and population control, American toilet-building as nation-
building dated back to the colonial era and continued into the Cold War. But whereas a small 
number of historians of U.S. colonialism and the Progressive Era have examined the centrality of 
latrine construction to public health projects in U.S. colonies and at home, historians of U.S. 
foreign relations have entirely neglected the continuation of this disciplinary health regime in the 
postcolonial Global South after 1945.5 The failure to elaborate on a development approach with 
both colonial and domestic roots seems a surprising oversight given the work of historians who 
LGHQWLI\WKHURRWVRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶&ROG:DUGHYHORSPHQWSURMHFWVLQWKHFRORQLDOHUD, as 
well as scholarship which reveals the overlapping personnel, discourse, and practices of U.S. 
GRPHVWLFDQGRYHUVHDVGHYHORSPHQWSURMHFWVLQWKHHUDRI/\QGRQ-RKQVRQ¶V*UHDW6RFLHW\.6 
Andrew Rotter has called for historians of U.S. foreign relations to pay closer attention to the 
ways in which the senses shaped American encounters abroad and few areas present as 
promising an area of investigation in this regard as sanitation. Susan Carruthers has taken up this 
call, highlighting how American soldiers in occupied Europe and East Asia during and after 
World War Two created social and racial hierarchies by recording their disgust at the sanitary 
 
5 In his masterful work on biopolitics in the U.S.-occupied Philippines, Warwick Anderson suggests that aspects of 
the post-war international health services lie in U.S. colonial projects, though exploring those links lies beyond the 
SXUYLHZRIKLVERRN7KLVDUWLFOHLQYHVWLJDWHV$QGHUVRQ¶VVXJJHVWLRQWarwick Anderson, Colonial Pathologies: 
American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the Philippines (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 183-
184. 
6 On the colonial era roots of international development see Michael Adas, Dominance by Design: Technological 
,PSHUDWLYHVDQG$PHULFD¶V&LYLOL]LQJ0LVVLRQ (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006); Amanda Kay McVety, 
Enlightened Aid: U.S. Development as Foreign Policy in Ethiopia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 
David Ekbladh, The Great American Mission: Modernization the Construction of an American World Order  
3ULQFHWRQ3ULQFHWRQ8QLYHUVLW\3UHVVRQWKH³*OREDO*UHDW6RFLHW\´ VHH6WXDUW6FKUDGHU³7R6HFXUHWKH
Global Great Society: Participation in Pacification,´Humanity 7, no. 2 (2016): 225-253; Sheyda Jahanbani, 
³µ$FURVVWKH2FHDQ$FURVVWKH7UDFNV¶,PDJLQLQJ*OREDO3RYHUW\LQ&ROG:DU$PHULFD,´Journal of American 
Studies 48, no. 4 (2014): 937-974; Daniel Immerwahr, Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of 
Community Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015).  
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habits of people and the conditions of their toilets.7 Yet no work places U.S. sanitation schemes 
in a wider chronological and global frame, underscores how sensory perceptions and responses 
shaped biopolitical reforms on the ground, or identifies the salience of latrine construction in 
U.S. international history in the 20th century. By doing so, this article highlights the striking 
continuities in the logic of one American approach to international development over the course 
of the 20th Century: the role of the toilet as a tool of empire, governance, and biopolitical 
reform.8  
 
Although colonial medicine initially focused on protecting white enclaves, the 
development of the germ theory of disease in the late 19th century convinced colonial health 
officials, albeit slowly and unevenly, that colonizers would remain vulnerable unless medical 
interventions also targeted potentially diseased ³natives.´9 The shift away from theories of 
miasma and purely environmental explanations of disease to a focus instead on germs facilitated 
the rise of modern public health, requiring an emphasis on health education, as well as the 
targeting of microbes and vectors of disease. From the early 20th century, the more self-
FRQVFLRXVO\³SURJUHVVLYH´ colonial powers such as the United States and Japan therefore 
instituted hygienic reform campaigns in their colonies. Seeing the apparent filth of the colonized 
 
7 Andrew J. 5RWWHU³(PSLUHRIWKH6HQVHV+RZ6HHLQJ+HDULQJ6PHOOLQJ7DVWLQJDQGTouching Shaped Imperial 
(QFRXQWHUV´ Diplomatic History 35, no. 1 (2011): 3-19; Susan L. &DUUXWKHUV³/DWULQHVDVWKH0HDVXUHRI0HQ
American Soldiers and the Politics of DisguVWLQ2FFXSLHG(XURSHDQG$VLD´ Diplomatic History 42, no. 1 (2018): 
109-137. 
8 ,DPGUDZLQJRQ0LFKHO)RXFDXOW¶VFRQFHSWRIELRSROLWLFVDVDPRGHRIJRYHUQDQFHZLWKWKHPDQDJHPHQWRIOLIHDV
its fundamental objective, including the power to foster certain kinds of life and to allow other kinds of life to die. 
Foucault notes that such power is diffused through multiple nodes and functions to encourage populations to self-
regulate in the field of public health. See Paul Rabinow and Nikolas S. Rose, The Essential Foucault: Selections 
from Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984 (New York: New Press, 2003). 
9 David Arnold, Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-Century India (Berkeley: 
8QLYHUVLW\RI&DOLIRUQLD3UHVV0DULROD(VSLQRVD³$)HYHUIRU(PSLUH86'LVHDVH(UDGLFDWLRQLQ&XEDDV
&RORQLDO3XEOLF+HDOWK´LQColonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State, eds. Alfred 
McCoy and Francisco A. Scarano (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 288-296; Warwick Anderson, 
³([FUHPHQWDO&RORQLDOLVP3XEOLF+HDOWKDQGWKH3RHWLFVRI3ROOXWLRQ,´Critical Inquiry 21, No. 3 (1995): 645-646. 
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as a racial deficiency, divorced from social or economic context, colonial officials began 
instructing subjects about good hygienic habits, including the use of sanitary latrines. Protecting 
the health of local labor would allow colonial powers to better exploit the resources of empire 
but officials also used the image of the unsanitary ³native´ to justify the continuation of colonial 
rule. If these people could not govern their personal hygiene, colonial authorities and 
intellectuals reasoned, they very well could not govern themselves. In contrast with earlier 
visions of imperial medicine, colonial officials now saw these subjects as capable of change. But 
only through a process of reform could they become ready for independence. Applying this 
logic, colonial powers could defer independence indefinitely.10 
In the occupied Philippines, in a bid to protect the white population and to pacify colonial 
subjects, U.S. officers extended the logic of military sanitation to the population at large, 
conducting street cleaning and vaccination campaigns and deploying teams of inspectors to 
enforce sanitary regulations. As Warwick Anderson notes, Americans became obsessed with the 
SUHVXPHG³SURPLVFXRXVGHIHFDWLRQ´ of Filipinos and demanded that they embrace sanitary 
reform. Americans aspired to construct toilets throughout the archipelago but began by installing 
permanent sanitary exhibits in many towns. Colonial officials even LQWURGXFHG³SULY\GD\´ 
during which Filipinos were expected to build or repair their toilets.11 The United States was not 
unique among the colonial powers in this regard. In colonized Korea, Japanese popular writings 
about Korean hygienic habits established difference between colonizers and the colonized, while 
military-WUDLQHG³K\JLHQHSROLFH´launched aggressive public health campaigns, including home 
inspections. Failing to reform Korean behavior within their private dwellings, Japanese colonial 
 
10 Anderson, Colonial Pathologies, passim; Bonnie McElhiQQ\³µ.LVVLQJD%DE\LV1RWDW$OO*RRGIRU+LP¶
Infant Mortality, Medicine, and Colonial Modernity in the U.S.-2FFXSLHG3KLOLSSLQHV´American Anthropologist 
107, no. 2 (2005): 183-194; Amrith, Decolonizing International Health, 9-11; Arnold, Colonizing the Body, 13, 61. 
11 Anderson, Colonial Pathologies, 45-129. 
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officials built a network of public toilets in Seoul. But Korean treatment of these public facilities 
failed to live up to Japanese expectations.12 Such reforms may have been intrusive, but they were 
nonetheless extremely limited in scope. Colonial powers could be more easily condemned for 
neglecting the health of their colonial subjects than for imposing biomedical interventions.13  
These programs in the colonial periphery often shaped projects targeting the urban or 
rural poor in the metropole. The presence of tropical diseases in the U.S. south made it easier for 
U.S. reformers to conceptualize the south, along with the colonies, as a problem area, distinct 
from the rest of the country.14 Reformers in the U.S. south were able to draw on the work of 
army surgeon Bailey K. Ashford, who had uncovered the link between hookworm disease and 
anemia during the military occupation of Puerto Rico in the wake of the Spanish-American War. 
After examining LOOSHDVDQWV¶IHFHV$VKIRUGFRQFOXGHGWKDW anemia was not the product of a poor 
GLHWEXWGXHWRWKHFRQGLWLRQVRQWKHLVODQG¶VFRIIHHSODQWDWLRQVLQZKLFKWKHKRRNZRUPSDUDVLWH
thrived. Lacking toilets, workers practiced open defecation, and could ill afford shoes. The 
hookworm parasite travelled through the soft skin between the toes of any barefoot people who 
encountered the ³SROOXWHG´VRLO. Although the subsequent eradication program was embraced by 
many peasants, the emphasis on medical treatment over sanitary improvements led to high 
reinfection rates.15  
As was the case in the colonies, domestic programs served to reinforce hierarchies of race 
and citizenship. DUDZLQJRQ$VKIRUG¶VZRUNzoologist Charles Wardell Stiles set out to 
 
12 7RGG$+HQU\³6DQLWL]LQJ(PSLUH-DSDQHVH$UWLFXODWLRQVRI.RUHDQ2WKHUQHVVDQGWKH&RQVWUXFWLRQRI(arly 
Colonial Seoul, 1905-´ Journal of Asian Studies 64, no. 3 (2005): 635-675. 
13 Amrith, Decolonizing International Health, 22. 
14 Natalie J. Ring, The Problem South: Region, Empire, and the New Liberal State, 1880-1930 (Athens: University 
of Georgia Press, 2012), 3-10. 
15 Jose Amador, Medicine and Nation Building in the Americas, 1890-1940 (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 
2015), 68-94; Nicole Elise Trujillo-3DJDQ³:RUPVDVD+RRNIRU&RORQLVLQJ3XHUWR5LFR´Social History of 
Medicine 26, no. 4 (2013): 611-632. 
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investigate hookworm disease in the U.S. south. Although the disease affected as much as 40% 
of the southern population across all social groups, Stiles was preoccupied with the prevalence of 
the disease among poor whites, many of whom practiced open defecation. The pale and bony 
appearance of sufferers VHHPHGWRFRQILUPHXJHQLFLVWV¶VXVSLFLRQVRI white racial degeneration, 
but reformers like Stiles believed eradication would secure poor whites racial whiteness, 
transforming them into productive workers and attracting northern investment. For these reasons, 
the idea that poor whites shared a common ³germ of laziness´ with colonized peasants did not 
last long because it threatened the racial hierarchies upon which colonialism and Jim Crow 
rested.16  
6WLOHVIRXQGDVSRQVRULQWKH5RFNHIHOOHU)RXQGDWLRQ¶V Sanitary Commission on the 
Eradication of Hookworm (RSC) which was launched in 1909. The RSC posed the problem as 
one of individual responsibility, rather than social inequities, and aimed to end soil pollution 
through hygiene education and the construction and proper use of sanitary latrines. 
6FKRROKRXVHVGHHPHGFHQWHUVRILQIHFWLRQEHFDPH³PRGHOVRIPRGHUQK\JLHQH´IRUWKH
surrounding community through the construction of sanitary privies and health education. 
Reformers faced resistance to sanitary engineering from some local communities and health 
professionals, but the program significantly reduced infection rates and led to a corresponding 
increase in school attendance, literacy, and income. Stories of recovery invariably pointed to 
increased earnings and improved living standards that resulted.17 Narratives of productivity and 
 
16 Matthew Wray, Not Quite White: White Trash and the Boundaries of Whiteness (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2006), 98-104; Amador, Medicine and Nation Building, 91. 
17 John Ettling, The Germ of Laziness: Rockefeller Philanthropy and Public Health in the New South (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1981), 22-25; Ring, The Problem South, 61-76; :LOOLDP$/LQN³3ULYLHV3URJUHVVLYLVP
and Public Schools: Health Reform and Public Education in the Rural South, 1909-´Journal of Southern History 
54, no. 2 (1988): 630-631; John Farley, To Cast Out Disease: A History of the International Health Division of the 
Rockefeller Foundation (1913-1951) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 27-+R\W%OHDNOH\³'LVHDVHDQG
Development: Evidence from Hookworm EradicatiRQLQWKH$PHULFDQ6RXWK´The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
122, no. 1 (2007): 73-117. 
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efficiency were also evident in the Rockefeller Foundation¶VInternational Health Division 
(IHD), which by mid-1920s was active throughout Latin America and the British Empire. The 
IHD focused primarily on areas of economic production, dedicating substantial energy to 
persuading plantation owners to invest in latrines. From the late 1920s, however, the division 
increasingly shifted its focus away from sanitation to laboratory research into the etiology of 
yellow fever and malaria, paving the way for the technologically driven campaigns of the 
postwar years.18  
 One might get the impression from the historiography of Cold War development that 
American nation-building and pacification cum toilet-building ended with the era of 
decolonization but it appears that historians have simply overlooked the continuities in 
discourses and strategies of sanitation after 1945. Americans continued to make judgements 
DERXWSHRSOHV¶ILWQHVVIRUVHOI-rule based on their adherence to American sanitary norms. In 
occupied Korea, Americans were evidently unimpressed by forty years of Japanese reforms. The 
absence of sanitary facilities, public defecation, and continued use of night soil, convinced many 
Americans that Koreans were not ready for independence.19 And Americans continued to build 
toilets to address these shortcomings. The Institute for Inter-American Affairs (IIAA), a U.S. 
government agency established as bulwark against Nazi influence in Latin America but acquiring 
an anti-Communist rationale after the war, carried out sanitation and disease eradication 
programs targeting U.S. military bases and workers in raw material-producing areas. By 1953, 
the institute estimated it had assisted in the construction of almost forty thousand outdoor toilets 
 
18 Soma Hewa, Colonialism, Tropical Disease, and Imperial Medicine: Rockefeller Philanthropy in Sri Lanka 
(Lanham: University Press of America, 1995), 40-85; John Farle\³7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO+HDOWK'LYLVLRQRIWKH
Rockefeller Foundation: the Russell Years, 1920-´LQInternational Health Organisations and Movements, 
1918-1939, ed. Paul Weindling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 218.  
19 &DUUXWKHUV³/DWULQHVDVWKH0HDVXUHRI0HQ´-19. 
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in rural areas of Latin America.20 It is hardly a surprise that Che Guevara identified this 
phenomenon as the central plank of U.S.-sponsored development in the western hemisphere. 
Toilets were also a common product of post-war community development projects. 
Theoretically, this approach empowered local communities to select their own development 
schemes by consensus and the community would then carry out the projects with the assistance 
of government workers, using their own labor and funds.21 There was, however, often a gap 
between theory and practice. In model villages in the heartland of the communist insurgency in 
northeast Thailand, for example, Thai Community Development workers ZRXOGEXLOG³VKLQ\
new WRLOHWV´ along main roads without consulting the villagers about their preferences. The toilets 
provided physical evidence of progress for visiting dignitaries from Bangkok but went entirely 
unused because they were too far from YLOODJHUV¶KRPHV22 Further evidence from Thailand 
indicated that the message of health education may have been getting through but it appears that 
for at least some peasants, toilets were a manifestly American product and there were practical 
reasons for resistance to sanitary engineering. Sometimes, a verdant rice paddy simply offered 
more aesthetically pleasing surroundings. As one Thai farmer told an American doctor:  
 
you Americans are strange. Before you came here, if I felt like relieving myself, I 
found a quiet spot in the open with gentle breezes and often a pleasant vista. Then you 
came along and convinced me that this material that comes from me is one of the most 
GDQJHURXVWKLQJVZLWKZKLFKSHRSOHFDQKDYHFRQWDFW«7KHQWKHQH[WWKLQJ\RXWROGPH
 
20 :LOWRQ/+DOYHUVRQ³+HDOWK6RXWKRIWKH%RUGHU´,QVWLWXWHRI,QWHU-American Affairs: Building a Better 
Hemisphere Series, No. 17, January 1953, USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse (USAID-DEC), 
Document ID: PN-AEC-$QGUH/XL]9LHLUDGH&DPSRV³7KH,QVWLWXWHRI,QWHU-American Affairs and its Health 
3ROLFLHVLQ%UD]LOGXULQJ:RUOG:DU7ZR´Presidential Studies Quarterly, 28, no. 3 (1998): 523-534; Claude C. 
(UE³3UHOXGHWR3RLQW,97KH,Qstitute for Inter-$PHULFDQ$IIDLUV´Diplomatic History 9, no. 3 (1985): 249-269. 
21 Immerwahr, Thinking Small, passim. 
22 James Jouppi, War of Hearts and Minds: An American Memoir (Bloomington: iUniverse, 2011), 124-125. 
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was that I should dig a hole, and not only I, but many other people should concentrate 
this dangerous material in that hole. So now I have even closer contact with not only my 
RZQEXWHYHU\RQHHOVH¶VDQGLQDGDUNVPHOO\SODFHZLWKQRYLHZDWWKDW23 
  
Although occurring in dramatically differing contexts, American toilet-building 
performed some similar functions at home and abroad during these decades. The absence of 
sanitary facilities among certain populations allowed American reformers to establish or 
reinforce hierarchies of race and citizenship. The solution, toilet-building, was supposed to serve 
military, political and economic goals, pacifying the targets of reform and mobilizing resources. 
Sanitary models served as exemplars for replication by surrounding communities. Reformers 
hoped that such models would encourage the targets of reform to eventually govern themselves 
LQWKHILHOGRISXEOLFKHDOWKWKRXJKWKH\ZHUHIUHTXHQWO\GLVDSSRLQWHGE\WKHLUVXEMHFWV¶LQDELOLW\
to overcome their unsanitary habits. The American War in Vietnam might seem to offer the least 
likely setting for such a project of biopolitical reform. And yet, during the latter years of the war, 
American development officials and their South Vietnamese allies attempted ambitious programs 
which adhered to a similar logic as those stretching from the colonial Philippines to Cold War 
Latin America. 
 
Nation-Building or Toilet-Building?: The Sanitary Hamlet Program in South 
Vietnam 
American observers of interwar French Indochina, Mark Bradley has revealed, placed 
Vietnamese in a racialized cultural hierarchy, viewing them DV³SULPLWLYH,´³OD]\,´ ³XQFOHDQ,´ 
 
23 .HHVYDQ'LMN³6RDSLVWKH2QVHWRI&LYLOL]DWLRQ´LQCleanliness and Culture: Indonesian Histories, eds. Kees 
van Dijk and Jean Gelman Taylor (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2011), 4. 
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and innately incapable of self-governance. At the same time, they viewed French colonialism as 
an economic, administrative, and moral failure. In the area of rural public health, French colonial 
authorities had made limited inroads. Largescale vaccination campaigns during the interwar 
years, primarily for the purposes of protecting the white population and mobilizing colonized 
labor, significantly reduced instances of smallpox and cholera, but rural public health services 
were non-existent and most Vietnamese never encountered western medicine. Americans 
asserted that they were superior colonizers, that their civilizing mission in the Philippines was 
uniquely effective, and that the United States could do a better job than the French in guiding 
Vietnam out of its backwardness. Despite their dismissal of French colonialism, Americans 
relied for their information about Indochina on French Orientalist writings, generating a shared 
Euro-American colonial discourse.24  
These assumptions and perceptions formed in the interwar years continued to inform 
American policies toward Vietnam during World War Two and beyond. Implicit in American 
nation-building strategies in South Vietnam after partition in 1954, was the assumption that 
Vietnamese required continued American tutelage. Through its massive military and civilian 
presence in the country and its huge infusions of economic and military aid which kept the 
FRXQWU\DIORDWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVH[HUFLVHGH[WHQVLYHLQIOXHQFHRQ6RXWK9LHWQDP¶VSROLWLFVDQG
society. U.S. officials supported certain political and military personalities, backed coups, and 
pressured, cajoled or advised South Vietnamese leaders to implement their preferred policies. 
American social scientists and development experts helped uphold American power over the 
RVN, producing a vast body of NQRZOHGJHRQ6RXWK9LHWQDP¶VSUREOHPVRILQVXUJHQF\DQG
 
24 Mark Philip Bradley, Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919-1950 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 46-47; Pierre Brocheux and Daniel Hemery, Indochina: An 
Ambiguous Colonization, 1858-1954 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 204-205; 255-258. 
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³underdevelopment´ attaching solutions, sidelining alternatives, and paving the way for nation-
building interventions. Undoubtedly, the American presence undercut RVN sovereignty, but 
scholars have revealed the extent to which the United States struggled to dictate South 
Vietnamese politics and to which nation-building was the outcome of contested and conflicting 
U.S. and South Vietnamese visions and agendas. Not only were U.S. officials highly sensitive to 
accusations of neocolonialism, moving them to tread carefully on RVN sovereignty but, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, South Vietnam also had its own political and social dynamics which predated 
U.S. intervention and which shaped the origins, course and outcome of the war.25 RVN elites 
chafed at their dependency on the United States and viewed development as a means of escaping 
this condition. For these reasons, RVN and U.S. officials did not march in lockstep with one 
another. In the realm of sanitation, however, they shared a discourse of modernization, 
civilization, and social control, in part because RVN leaders accepted some of the premises about 
hygiene upon which colonial domination had rested. But they blended these universalizing ideas 
with a particular understanding of Vietnamese history, culture, and needs. 
Despite the emphasis on nation-building during the early years of the American War, by 
the late 1960s the United States and its RVN allies had made little progress toward building a 
public health infrastructure in the countryside. U.S. health assistance to Vietnam began with 
nursing education programs during the First Indochina War, followed by technical assistance, 
overseas training programs, and the provision of medical equipment. The World Health 
Organization also ran a malaria eradication program alongside the South Vietnamese 
government. Although the United States posted American doctors to provincial hospitals and 
 
25 Philip E. Catton, 'LHP¶V)LQDO)DLOXUH3UHOXGHWR$PHULFD¶V:DULQ9LHWQDP(Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 2002); Edward G. Miller, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013). 
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supported training programs, civilian health services remained critically understaffed and under-
resourced. The vast majority of doctors served in the armed forces, while remaining civilian 
doctors mostly practiced in towns and cities. Rural health stations, staffed by part-time 
government workers equipped with a medical chest and training manual, became ready targets 
for insurgent attacks, and rural population continued to rely primarily on practitioners of 
indigenous medicine. 
As the conflict escalated in the early 1960s, the U.S. increasingly used health care to 
serve counterinsurgency goals. Often conducted during ³FRUGRQDQGVHDUFK´RSHUDWLRQs, the 
Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) and Dental Civic Action Program (DENTCAP) 
provided outpatient care in rural areas while simultaneously training South Vietnamese medical 
technicians.26 Troops would surround a village and question military-aged residents while U.S. 
and Vietnamese medics immunized villagers against common diseases, treated basic medical 
problems, extracted teeth, and handed out soap and leaflets on hygiene. Military bands and 
magicians performed as the crowd looked on, sometimes with enthusiasm and sometimes with 
dismay. One report complained that MEDCAPs might have some advantage in convincing locals 
WKDW³:HVWHUQPDJLFLVPRUHSRZHUIXOWKDQORFDOPDJLF´but it ³UHSUHVHQts an inexcusable 
SURVWLWXWLRQRIPHGLFDOIDFLOLWLHV´27 American claims that the program would deliver better 
health care aside, the true DLPZDV³psychologicaOUDWKHUWKDQPHGLFDO´ focused on winning the 
 
26 Robert J. Wilensky, Military Medicine to Win Hearts and Minds: Aid to Civilians in the Vietnam War (Lubbock, 
TX: Texas Tech University Press, 2004), 53-61. 
27 ³6XPPDU\RI&HUWDLQ2EVHUYDWLRQVDQG&RQFOXVLRQV9LVLWRI'U'DYLG0F.5ioch, Director, Division of 
Neuropsychiatry Walter Reed Army Institute of Research,´0DUFK 21-April 9, 1964, Reel 1, Box 1, History Backup 
Files (II), Papers of William C. Westmoreland, part I, History, Statements, and Clippings File, Roosevelt Institute 
for American Studies, Middelburg. 
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loyalty of the rural population by establishing a benevolent government presence in the 
countryside.28 
Such piecemeal efforts did not address the poor sanitation which was responsible for 
many common illnesses in Vietnam. The Walter Reed Army Institute of Research reported that 
KRRNZRUPGLVHDVHZDV³DOPRVWXQLYHUVDO´ and dysentery and acute enteric diseases were very 
FRPPRQ³reflecting the sanitary conditions and hygienic habits of the population.´ ³([FUHWD
GLVSRVDOIDFLOLWLHV´ were inadequate and most sewage was discharged into rivers.29 These 
problems were even worse in refugee camps. After-care and sanitation were almost non-existent. 
In many camps, refugees received little or no food, had no access to water, and inadequate 
shelter. Where there were toilets, one American observer noted, ³SHRSOHZRQ¶WXVHWKHP
DQ\ZD\´30  
For the American soldier serving in Vietnam, filth was everywhere and powerful smells 
were often the first thing GIs noted upon their arrival. Many were struck by the pungent smell of 
nuoc mam, the ubiquitous Vietnamese ILVKVDXFH³The whole country smelled like that,´ 
reported Marine Private Bill Hancock, ³when you first got over there it was really pungent and 
really was, kind of an offensive odor to us.´31 For others, it was Vietnamese sanitary behavior at 
which they recoiled, DQGVROGLHUV¶ comments reveal the extent to which Americans continued to 
 
28 ³0HPR0$&9-IVC-4) - Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) - UHVXPPDU\RISURJUDP´2FWREHU
1967, Folder 04, Box 01, John Proe Collection, Texas Tech University-Vietnam Virtual Archive (hereafter TTU-
VVA), Item No.: 9860104003. 
29 ³+HDOWK'DWD3XEOLFDWLRQV1R5HYLVHG-DQXDU\- The Republic of Viet-Nam (South Viet-Nam) - 
Department of Health Data, Division of Preventive Medicine,´ January 1966, Folder 19, Box 01, Robert M. Hall 
Collection, TTU-VVA, Item No.: 16090119001. 
30 ³+HDULQJV%HIRUHWKH6XEFRPPLWWHHWR,QYHVWLJDWH3UREOHPV&RQQHFWHGZLWK5HIXJHHVDQG(VFDSHHVRIWKH
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-First Congress, First Session on: Civilian Casualty, Social 
:HOIDUHDQG5HIXJH3UREOH>VLF@´Folder 22, Box 10, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 11- Monographs, TTU-VVA, 
Item No.: 2391022003; ³5HIXJHHDQG&LYLOLDQ:DU&DVXDOW\3UREOHPVLQ9LHWQDP- Prepared for Subcommittee to 
Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees of the Committee on the Judiciary United States 
Senate by the General Accounting Office,´ December 14, 1970, Folder 08, Box 31, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 
03 - Refugees and Civilian Casualties, TTU-VVA, Item No.: 2223108011. 
31 ³,QWHUYLHZZLWK:LOOLDP+DQFRFN,´ June 30, 2003, William Hancock Collection, TTU-VVA, Item No.: OH0311 
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place Vietnamese in a racialized hierarchy based on sanitary practices. 7KHSHRSOH³OLYHOLNH
pigs,´UHPDUNHGRQHVROGLHU ³,W¶VOLNHWKH\¶UHSLJPLHVRU$IULFDQVRUVRPHWKLQg,´H[FODLPHG
DQRWKHUVROGLHU³7KH\¶UHYHU\LJQRUDQW7KH\VKLWDQGZLSHWKHLUDVVZLWKWKHLUILQJHU7KH\
smHOO7KHYLOODJHVVWLQN6WLQN´32 The sight of Vietnamese squatting in fields was particularly 
disturbing to young U.S. troops. Sven Eriksson, thHSVHXGRQ\PRXVDQWLKHURRI'DQLHO/DQJ¶V
New Yorker feature-turned-movie Casualties of War, went so far as to say that the perceived filth 
of the villagers devalued the American cause in Vietnam: ³aOOWKDWPDQ\RIXVFRXOGWKLQN«ZDV
that we were fools to be ready to die for a SHRSOHZKRGHIHFDWHGLQSXEOLF´.33 Some soldiers even 
feared the deadly potential of Vietnamese excrement. According to some GIs, North Vietnamese 
and Viet Cong troops employed ³VKLWERPEV,´ produced using ammonia from broken down 
human waste.34  
Ironically, the foulest smelling sites in Vietnam were often American bases and camps. In 
rudimentary outhouses, soldiers would sit over a hole and defecate into a modified fifty-five-
gallon drum below. Soldiers on latrine duty would routinely remove the drums and, while 
stirring the contents, burn this American shit with aviation fuel or diesel. So appalling was the 
stench that other ³Iree world´ soldiers such as New Zealanders, who employed different means 
RIZDVWHGLVSRVDOFRPPHQWHGXSRQWKH³KRUUHQGRXVSUDFWLFH´7KHLPSOLFDWLRQWKDWGHIHFDWLRQ
practices were shaped by context, was evidently lost on American soldiers as they made 
judgements about Vietnamese. Instead, some units would pool money and outsource the task to a 
 
32 *HRUJH&+HUULQJ³µ3HRSOHV4XLWH$SDUW¶$PHULFDQV6RXWK9LHWQDPHVHDQGWKH:DULQ9LHWQDP´ Diplomatic 
History 14, no. 1 (1990): 12; Christian G. Appy, Working Class War: American Combat Soldiers in Vietnam 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press), 129-130. 
33 'DQLHO/DQJ³&DVXDOWLHVRI:DU,´New Yorker, 18 October 1969. 
34 Mark Baker, NAM: The Vietnam War in the Words of the Men and The Women Who Fought There (London: 
Abacus, 1983), 142-143. 
 20 
9LHWQDPHVH³VKLWEXUQHU,´DWOHDVWRQHRIZKLFKZDVZLWQHVVHGFRQGXFWLQJWKHMREZLWKDSODVWLF
bag over his head to mask the stench.35 
It was not only the ³grunts´ who believed that Vietnamese were filthy. Development 
professionals, whose job was to assist the U.S. war effort by implementing social and economic 
improvements, also condemned Vietnamese practices. Larry Flanagan, an officer with the U.S. 
$JHQF\IRU,QWHUQDWLRQDO'HYHORSPHQW86$,'VDLG³WKH\KDYHQRLGHDRIZK\Dclean market 
LVDQ\EHWWHUWKDQDGLUW\PDUNHWLW¶VMXVWDPDUNHWDQGOHDYLQJWUDVKDURXQGKDVEHHQDZD\RI
life for who knows how long.´)RU)ODQDJDQILOWKZDVD9LHWQDPHVHWUDGLWLRQ36 GIs found it 
galling that their South Vietnamese counterparts dismissed American attempts to make 
improvements in the countryside. One GI recounted how he witnessed a group of ARVN soldiers 
laughing at American efforts to teach a group of villagers better sanitary practices. These 
Vietnamese ZHUH³so stupid that they [diGQ¶W@XQGHUVWDQGWKDWDJUHDWSHRSOHwant[ed] to help a 
weak people,´ noted thHVROGLHU³6RPHERG\KDGWRVKRZSRRUSHRSOHEHWWHUZD\VRIOLYLQ¶OLNH
sewer disposal and sanitation and things like that.´37 
3DUDGR[LFDOO\LWZDVRQO\GXULQJWKHSHULRGRI³9LHWQDPL]DWLRQ´WKDWWKH6RXWK
Vietnamese government and its U.S. sponsors attempted to establish a sustainable public health 
system in the countryside as part of their counterinsurgency strategy. Following the 1968 Tet 
Offensive, the Johnson and later Nixon administration began winding down the U.S. 
commitment to Indochina and shifted the burden of fighting to the South Vietnamese military. 
 
35 ³,QWHUYLHZZLWK.HYLQ%RYLOO´0D\.HYLQ%RYLOO&ROOHFWLRQ778-VVA, Item No.: OH0091; 
³1DUUDWLYH- '$6320$&9$UP\$3KRWR7HDPV0HHWV2GG(YHQWVDQG([HFUDWLRQ-REV´Folder 15, Box 01, 
William Foulke Collection, TTU-VVA, Item No.: 10400115003. 
36 ³86$LG,QWHUYLHZZLWK/DUU\)ODQDJDQ3URYLQFLDO5HSUHVHQWDWLYHZLWK$JHQF\IRU,QWHUQDWLRQDO
'HYHORSPHQW5HJLRQ,,'DUODF´0D\ 31, 1966, Folder 23, Box 02, Larry Flanagan Collection, TTU-VVA, Item 
no.: 0880223001. 
37 Loren Baritz, Backfire: A History of How American Culture Led Us into Vietnam, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1998), 4. 
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:LWK³9LHWQDPL]DWLRQ´WKH6RXWK9LHWQDPHVHVWDWH¶VILQDQFLDODQGPDQSRZHUUHVRXUFHVZHUH
thinly stretched. As the RVN prepared for General Mobilization in response to the Tet Offensive, 
the Ministry of Health (MOH) expressed concern that more medical personnel would be drafted, 
leading to paralysis in some areas of civilian health. The military, the MOH noted, had nearly its 
full complement of physicians, pharmacists and dentists, while the civilian branch had less than 
40% of its required staff.38 7KHPLOLWDU\¶VGUDLQRQQDWLRQDOUHVRXUFHVZDVVXFKWKDWE\WKH
02+¶VRSHUDWLRQVDFFRXQWHGIRUMXVWRIWKHQDWLRQDOEXGJHW0LQLVWHURI+HDOWK7UDQ0LQK
Tung noted that in most countries this figure was 6-12%. To compensate for the shortfall, the 
PLQLVWU\VRXJKWDVVLVWDQFHIURP³IUHHZRUOG´FRXQWULHVRWKHUWKDQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQGLQ
raised US$21m, more than its projected budget for 1971. However, these countries were mostly 
willing to assist with hospital construction and training programs and there was little left for rural 
health projects.39 
These shortages affected all areas of nation-building and development, necessitating a 
counterinsurgency strategy based on local self-sufficiency. But the requirement of self-
sufficiency was also in keeping with RVN leaders understanding of the social, economic, and 
SROLWLFDOIXQFWLRQRI9LHWQDP¶VYLOODJHV591HOLWHVKRSHd WRWUDQVIRUP6RXWK9LHWQDP¶VUXUDO
communities into versions of the closed, corporate villages which they believed had existed in 
QRUWKHUQ9LHWQDP¶V5HG5LYHU'HOWDLQWKHSUHFRORQLDOHUD They viewed these villages as the 
HVVHQFHRI9LHWQDP¶VSDVWRUDOFXOWXUH and imagined them to have been cooperative, 
economically self-sufficient, and autonomous. They were fundamentally democratic because 
 
38 ³0LQLVWU\RI+HDOWK¶V9LHZSRLQW&RQFHUQLQJWKH*HQHUDO0RELOL]DWLRQ2UGHU´$SULO Box 2, Health and 
6DQLWDWLRQ)<¶86$,'0LVVLRQWR9LHWQDP3XEOLF+HDOWK'LYLVLRQ6XEMHFW)LOHVRIWKH$VVLVWDQW'LUHFWRU
1966-1970, RG286, National Archives (NARA-II), College Park, MD. 
39 ³9YWRQJNet tinh hinh ngoai vien ve y te WURQJQDP´>6XPPDU\of Foreign Aid Situation for Health in 
1970], 11 December 1970, Folder 27150, Phu Thu Tuong [Office of the Prime Minister], Trung Tam Luu Tru Quoc 
Gia II [National Archives Center II, Ho Chi Minh City, hereafter TTLTQGII]. 
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³SRZHU>ZDV@KHOGE\WKHSHRSOH´DQGWKHYLOODJHQRWDEOHVVHUYHGWKHSHRSOH¶VLQWHUHVWV7KLV
image was a product of Orientalist colonial writings on Southeast Asia, but it was one many 
anticolonial nationalists embraced. As the Vietnamese migrated south in the 17th and 18th 
century, they established more scattered settlements and, RVN elites believed, the close-knitted 
nature of village life had been lost. The villages essential character had been further undermined 
by French colonialism and Viet Cong subversion, destabilizing the spirit of collective 
responsibility and organizational structures with which might be mobilized against the 
insurgency.40 The history of RVN counterinsurgency and development efforts reveals repeated 
attempts to reconstitute South Vietnam¶VUXUDOVHWWOHPHQWVDVVHOI-defending, self-governing, and 
self-developing units.  
The restoration of this order was not only desirable, but appeared more feasible due to the 
new dynamics of the war in the countryside after 1968. Following the massive and costly North 
Vietnamese and National Liberation Front (NLF) offensives of 1968, U.S. and South Vietnamese 
forces launched a counter-offensive which attempted to fill the resulting power vacuum. They 
spread out into the countryside establishing a thin network of village security posts, manned by 
local paramilitary forces and around which the local population was violently compelled to 
move.41 In many villages, the government now controlled only some of WKHYLOODJH¶VVHYHUDO
hamlets, while the rest remained contested, enemy-controlled, or were wiped off the map 
altogether. As with all counter-insurgency operations, this campaign witnessed not only the 
selective destruction of communities and physical spaces, but also an effort to reconstruct a new 
 
40 Nguyen Dang Thuc, Democracy in Traditional Vietnamese Society, (Saigon: Department of National Education, 
1961), 5; -DVRQ$3LFDUGµ³)HUWLOH/DQGV$ZDLW´7KH3URPLVHDQG3LWIDOOVRI'LUHFWHG5HVHWWOHPHQW-¶
Journal of Vietnamese Studies 11 (2016), 58-102; Geoffrey Stewart, µ+HDUWV0LQGVDQG&RQJ'DQ9X7KH6SHFLDO
Commissariat for Civic Action and Nation-%XLOGLQJLQ1JR'LQK'LHP¶V9LHWQDP-¶Journal of 
Vietnamese Studies 6 (2011), 62-65. 
41 David Elliott, The Vietnamese War: Revolution and Social Change in the Mekong Delta, 1930-1975, vol. 2 
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 1145-1156. 
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political, socioeconomic, and spatial order thereafter. Within these government-controlled 
spaces, the RVN re-introduced village council elections and launched the Village Self-
Development Program, a scheme which granted VN$1,000,000 (approx. $8,500) to villages to 
carry out popularly selected community development projects. The VSD aimed to ³UHVWRUHWKH
vitality and the authority of the villages through the democratic activities of the rural people.´42 
Amidst ongoing negotiations in Paris and the prospect of a ceasefire-in-place and competitive 
elections with the NLF, the objective of these efforts was to stake a government claim on the 
countryside, restore communal solidarity, and to draw villagers into a relationship with the state.  
RVN leaders did not have a wholly idealized vision of the villages, however. As Minister 
IRU5XUDO'HYHORSPHQW1JX\HQ'XF7KDQJQRWHGUXUDOSDFLILFDWLRQZRXOGSUHVHUYHWKHYLOODJHV¶
³ILQHFXVWRPV´ZKLOHHOLPLQDWLQJ³GHSUDYHG´RQHV43 Elections and community development 
projects would restore village autonomy, but aspects of rural life required modernization. The 
Ministry of Health was enlisted in this larger goal of popular mobilization, self-sufficiency, and 
the modernization of rural behavior. The rural health program was JXLGHGE\WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V
SDFLILFDWLRQVORJDQ³WKHSHRSOHDFWWKHFDGUHVPRELOL]HDQGWKHJRYHUQPHQWVXSSRUWV,´ but these 
projects would also eliminate ³backward´ customs. The RVN Ministry of Health noted that rural 
SHRSOHZRXOGQRWRYHUFRPHWKHLU³XQVDQLWDU\KDELWV´XQWLO³WKHLUDQFLHQWWUDGLWLRQVDQGREVFXU
>VLF@VXSHUVWLWLRQV´about the causes of disease KDGEHHQ³FOHDUHGDZD\IURPWKHLUPLQGV.´44 
While authorities in North Vietnam enlisted indigenous medical practices in their war of 
 
42 µ&KXRQJ7ULQK7X7XF3KDW7ULHQ;D¶>9LOODJH6HOI-Development Program], February 24, 1969, Folder 109, Phu 
Tong Thong De Nhi Cong Hoa [Office of the President of the Second Republic, hereafter PTTDNCH], TTLTQGII. 
43 1JX\HQ'XF7KDQJ³'XRQJ/RL;D\'XQJ1RQJ7KRQFXD&KLQK3KXWURQJQDP´>7KHJRYHUQPHQW¶VUXUDO
development policy in 1967], (Saigon: Tong Bo Xay Dung Nong Thon va Tong Bo Thong Tin Chieu Hoi, 1966), 
21-22. 
44 ³&Kuong trinh hoat dong 4 nam (1972-1975) cua Bo Y TH´>0LQLVWU\RI+HDOWK¶V)RXr-Year Program of 
Activities (1972-1975)], Folder 3754, PTTDNCH-77/74*,,³*XLGHERRNIRU6HWWLQJ8S6DQLWDU\+DPOHW´
December 17, 1970, Box 43, File 1606-07A Sanitation- 1971 (Part 1 of 2), MACV, HQ CORDS, MR4/Public 
Health Div, General Records, 1966- 1972, RG472, NARA-II. 
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resistance against France and the United States and in domestic nation-building, RVN authorities 
sidelined such practices in favor of western biomedicine. After all, as Van Van Cua, an army 
medical doctor and instructor at the National Institute of Public Health noted, sanitation 
emanated from a Euro-American core, beginning with the work of Edwin Chadwick in England 
and Lemuel Shattuck in the United States.45 Encouraging rural Vietnamese to defecate in the 
correct place, embrace germ theory, and dispose of their rubbish in an acceptable fashion thus 
became part of the mission to force them from tradition to modernity. In this sense, elite South 
Vietnamese attitudes the peasantry¶VK\JLHQLFKDELWV mirrored the late colonial discourse of the 
unsanitary Other. 
Even as American and South Vietnamese officials attempted to transform hygienic habits 
in the countryside, however, they debated the relative merits of existing rural practices. One of 
the most hotly disputed issues, and one that was never resolved, was the use of fish pond latrines. 
A common feature of the rural landscape, these rudimentary and rickety structures consisted of a 
wooden platform with a hole, jutting out over a pond, and into which residents would defecate. 
The fish from the pond were harvested and consumed by the hamlet residents or sold at local 
markets. Although fish pond latrines were outlawed in a 1956 decree, construction continued 
unabated. American and South Vietnamese officials by no means concurred on the ban. In some 
instances, American agencies actively promoted the practice. In 1966, USAID published 
guidance for setting up fish pond latrines in hamlet schools in the Mekong Delta. The authors 
QRWHGWKDW³WKHILVKSRQGODWULQHKDVIDOOHQLQWRGLVUHSXWHEHFDXVHHGXFDWHG9LHWQDPHVHFRQVLGHU
 
45 9DQ9DQ&XD³9DL7UR<7H9H6LQK&RQJ&RQJ7URQJ.KXRQ.KR3KDW7ULHQ4XRF*LD´>7KH5ROHRI+HDOWK
Public Health within the Framework of National Development], Phat Trien Xa Hoi Trong Khuon Kho Phat Trien 
Quoc Gia, 19.4.1971-24.4.1971: Tai Lieu Hoi Thao, (Saigon: Bo Xa Hoi, Truong Cong Tac Xa Hoi, 1971), pp. 164-
165. On Vietnamese medicine see Laurence Monnais et al eds., Southern Medicine for Southern People: Vietnamese 
Medicine in the Making 1HZFDVWOH8SRQ7\QH&DPEULGJH6FKRODUV0LWFKLWDNH$VR³3DWULRWLF+\JLHQH
Tracing New Places of Knowledge Production about Malaria in Vietnam, 1919-´Journal of Southeast Asia 
Studies 44, no. 3 (2013): 423-443. 
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it to be primitive´DQG insist the fish will spread disease. But in the case of rural schools, other 
forms of toilet had failed to produce the desired results and fish pond latrines seemed the most 
practical solution. Over the next several years, USAID officials and South Vietnamese 
development cadres helped villagers construct many such structures in the delta.46 
Subsequent investigations by American and RVN officials, however, voiced concern 
about the health implications of fish pond latrines. Most ponds were connected to nearby rivers 
and canals, with no control over the sewage flow, potentially contaminating local water supplies. 
In some instances, when residents harvested the fish, they emptied the pond into a nearby field or 
stream. The assumption, held by some advocates of the practice, that villDJHUVILUVW³FOHDQHG´WKH
fish by transferring them to another pond for some period of time before they were consumed 
proved untrue in more than half the cases observed by one American investigator. Some 
development officials debated the wisdom of eating fish raised under such conditions, especially 
as consumers purchasing the fish at local markets may have been unaware of its provenance. 
These debates also produced a cleavage within the RVN bureaucracy as to whether the ponds 
could be harnessed WRZDUGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VYLVLRQRIUXUDOPRGHUQLW\. Ministry of Health 
officials condemned fish pond latrines as unsanitary, but Ministry of Agriculture planners saw 
these latrines¶ potential contribution to increasing protein production in the countryside. Despite 
these disagreements, the destruction of fish pond latrines would become one of the goals of the 
Sanitary Hamlet Program.47 
 
46 ³)LVK3RQG/DWULQHV,´$SULl 22, 1971, Box 43, Sanitation 1971 (Part 1 of 2), MACV, HQ CORDS, MR4/ Public 
Health Div, General Records, 1966- 1972, RG472, NARA-II³)LVK3RQG/DWULQHVIRU'HOWD+DPOHW6FKRROV- 
Region IV- Can Tho,´'HFHPEHU1, 1966, Box 44, Fish Pond Latrines- 1970, MACV, HQ CORDS, MR4/ Public 
Health Div, General Records, 1966- 1972, RG472, NARA-II. 
47 -RVHSK(+LJXHUD³)LVK3RQG/DWULQHV,´-DQXDU\ 11, 1971, Box 43, Sanitation- 1971 (Part 2 of 2), MACV, HQ 
CORDS, MR4/ Public Health Div, General Records, 1966- 1972, RG472, NARA-II. 
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Fish pond latrines aside, there remained an open question as to which type of sanitary 
toilet was most suitable to rural Vietnam. As the U.S. and South Vietnamese prepared to launch 
the Sanitary Hamlet program, Wilson Adams, the Regional Sanitarian for I Corps, offered some 
cautionary advice. Experience revealed that rural Vietnamese did not like sheltered pit latrines 
because they were ³odorous and invite fly breeding.´ Villagers were more receptive to pour-
flush, water-sealed latrines which could be easily constructed but maintenance proved more 
problematic. These sheltered, squat latrines featured an S-shaped or ³gooseneck´ bend in the 
pipe leading down to the pit, ensuring a small quantity of water always remained in the pipe and 
acted as barrier to flies and odors. These latrines were also more aesthetically pleasing because, 
unlike pit latrines, the user could not see down into the pit below. However, someone had to 
frequently replenish the water receptacle, while failure to adequately flush the toilet quickly 
resulted in ³deterioration of conditions to something far worse than the most poorly maintained 
pit latrine, and a situation which renders impossible the flushing by a conscientious user´ 
Regardless of which latrine was built, Adams noted, rural Vietnamese did not like communal 
toilets. Family latrines tended to be much better maintained but this was expensive and in highly 
congested areas, including refugee camps and many rural hamlets, not feasible. Any plan to 
provide community latrines would require strong leadership by the hamlet chief.48 
 Despite these uncertainties, U.S. and South Vietnamese planners could agree on the 
EURDGHUJRDORIVDQLWL]LQJDQGEHDXWLI\LQJ6RXWK9LHWQDP¶VUXUDOKDPOHWV. With this goal in mind, 
the RVN launched the National Sanitary Hamlet Program with two pilot hamlets in 1965, and 
expanded the program into a nationwide campaign in 1969. The program aimed to put an end to 
 
48 ³&DP7RDL7D\+DPOHW6DQLWDWLRQ6XUYH\- Findings and Recommendations,´-DQXDU\ 21, 1969, Box 2, Medical 
Assistance Training Program Files- Memos/Meetings/Training Aids/Reports, 1969, MACV, Office of Civil 
Operations and Rural Development Support, MR1 Public Health Division, RG472, NARA. 
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open defecation and to instruct villagers in the proper construction and use of toilets, as well as 
the disposal of waste and the establishment of a clean water supply. USAID officials were 
SOHDVHGWRUHSRUWWKLV³LQFUHDVHGDQGUHDOLQWHUHVWLQSXEOLFKHDOWKFRQFHSWV´FRQVWLWXWHG³WKH
most significant and exciting change´LQ\HDUV49 By encouraging villagers to sanitize their 
communities in a collaborative effort with one another and with the state, the RVN government 
and its U.S. advisers hoped to forge an anti-Communist identity in the villages and to provide the 
peasantry with the means to manage its own health care needs. The government chose model 
hamlets in select areas based on security, the likelihood of local cooperation, and sanitary needs. 
Residents in other hamlets could elect to voluntarily replicate these efforts and turn their 
communities into sanitary ones with funds from the Village Self-Development program 
combined with their own money and labor. 
(DFKRIWKH591¶VIRUW\-four provincial health services were called upon to send ten 
employees, including sanitarians and health educators, to attend a four-day course at the National 
Training Center in Vung Tau. Here, attendees spent mornings studying the purpose and theory of 
the Sanitary Hamlet Program, including lessons in how to construct latrines. In the afternoons, 
trainees visited a local hamlet for practical implementation of these ideas. On the first day, 
trainees were encouraged to visit hamlet families and earn their goodwill. On the second 
afternoon, trainees jumped straight to the point, informing the families of diseases caused by 
feces and suggesting that they join the trainees in the construction of a latrine.50 
 
49 ³3UHOLPLQDU\3ODQ5XUDO+HDOWK'HYHORSPHQW´XQGDWHGBox +/6*HQHUDO)<¶86$,'0Lssion to 
Vietnam/Public Health Division, Subject Files of the Assistant Director, 1966-1970, RG286, NARA-II; ³3XEOLF
+HDOWK%UDQFK´)HEUXDU\Box 62, Health Education/Malaria Eradication, CORDS Historical Working Group 
Files, 1967-1973, RG472, NARA-II. 
50 ³%DQJ7RP7KDW%LHQ%DQ3KLHQ+RS+RLJ1JD\-12-70 Tai Van Phong Ong Dong Ly Thao Luan Tiep 
YH9LHF+XDQ/X\HQ&DQ%R/DS$S9H6LQKWDL7UXQJ7DP+XDQ/X\HQ&DQ%R4XRF*LD9XQJ7DX´>6XPPDU\
of proceedings of meeting at 10.30 on 18.12.70 in the Office of the Director of the Cabinet to Discuss Cadre 
Training to Establish Sanitary Hamlets at the Vung Tau National Training Center], December 23, 1970, Folder 
2089, Bo Y Te [Ministry of Health], TTLTQG. 
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Having returned to their provinces, these health officials selected hamlets to serve as 
models and then visited the site to establish a local Health Protection Committee composed of 
hamlet leaders. With the assistance of the committee, the health officials would conduct a house-
to-house survey to map the sanitary conditions of the hamlet, during which residents would be 
exhorted to participate in the project. Health services would then attempt to mobilize the people 
through slogans, loudspeaker broadcasts, and movies, and local teachers would lead hamlet 
school children in renditions of the sanitary hamlet song. Once launched, the health workers 
would lead the community in the construction of a water-sealed latrine for each home, sanitary 
wells, garbage pits, and washable concrete market places. Open-air latrines were destroyed and 
residents conducted a general cleaning of public areas. The people would be immunized against 
common illnesses such as cholera and plague.51 
Long Qui hamlet in Tay Ninh province, was one of the earliest sanitary hamlets. 
Government cadres explained the need for better sanitation to the villagers and then solicited 
contributions of labor and money. With the assistance of a platoon of U.S. civic action troops, 
they directed the villagers in the drainage of the area to prevent malaria, the construction of 262 
water-sealed latrines and wells with cement walls, and WKHQLQVWUXFWHGWKHYLOODJHUVLQ³D
FRQFHQWUDWHGFOHDQLQJHIIRUWLQKRPHVNLWFKHQVSLJVWLHVHWF´8SRQFRPSOHWLRQ86REVHUYHUV
UHSRUWHG³PDQ\KHDOWKKD]DUGVKDGEHHQUHPRYHG.´7KHSURJUDPZDVQRWVLPSO\DERXWPHGLFDO
benefits, however. Aside from these, the project KDGDOVR³OHGWRPRUHDWWUDFWLYHKDPOHWDQGD
sense of community spirit.´52 Improvements would make residents healthier but also, by making 
 
51 ³*XLGH%RRNIRU6HWWLQJ8S6DQLWDU\+DPOHW´ December 17, 1970, Box 43, Sanitation-1971 (Part 1 of 2), 
MACV, HQ CORDS, MR4/Public Health Div, RG 472, NARA. 
52 ³81>VLF@%XOOHWLQ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Operations, TTU-99$,WHP1R³5HFRPPHQGDWLRQIRUWKH$ZDUGRIWKH0HULWRULRXV8QLW
Commendation´ May 18, 1971, 2nd Civil Affairs Company (1 of 2), 1971 Meritorious Unit Commendations, 
Vietnam Service Awards, RG472, accessed June 10, 2018, http://www.fold3.com/image/#269639814. 
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the villages more aesthetically pleasing, the sanitary hamlets appealed to the sensibilities of U.S. 
advisers and urbane Vietnamese officials. The mass mobilization of villagers for the public good 
forged stronger community links. Hygiene would therefore serve the goals of counterinsurgency. 
In some cases, government health cadres were pleased to report that villagers embraced 
the program. In the summer of 1971, government cadres brought the program to Tan Thanh 3, a 
hamlet of 900 farm people in An Xuyen province. Families in the hamlet had no sanitary or 
rubbish disposal facilities or potable water and relieved themselves in the rivers and fields. In 
spite of the challenges of establishing a sanitary hamlet here, government cadres praised the 
cooperation of the people. Heavy rains slowed progress and the agricultural calendar meant that 
government cadres could only meet with the people after they had finished work. Nonetheless, 
within three months, villagers had constructed 107 toilets and 132 garbage pits under the 
guidance of the hamlet health committee. One poor farmer, Mr. Lam, even single-handedly 
constructed a goose-neck WRLOHWHQWLUHO\IURPFHPHQW&DGUHVQRWHGWKH³WHFKQLFDOVKRUWFRPLQJV´
RIWKHILQLVKHGSURGXFWEXWLGHQWLILHG0U/DP¶VHQWKXVLDVPIRUWKHSURJUam as evidence of local 
support.53 
6RXWK9LHWQDP¶V refugee population became one of the principal targets of the program. 
These refugees had been driven into camps by an often-deliberate U.S. and South Vietnamese 
military strategy. In a 1968 memo, U.S. military commander William Westmoreland noted that 
removing thHUHYROXWLRQDU\IRUFHVIURPWKHYLOODJHVZDV³YHU\WLPHFRQVXPLQJ´EXWUHPRYLQJ
the people, upon whom the guerillas relied, ³FDQEHFDUULHGRXWUHODWLYHO\TXLFNO\.´$VWKHUHVXOW
of such policies, at least one third of the South Vietnamese population registered as refugees at 
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one time or another between 1965 and 1972.54 During the early years of the U.S. intervention, 
there seemed in the mind of the U.S. and South Vietnamese military planner and policymaker no 
contradiction between population displacement and health care. As a captive, dependent 
population, and despite the general lack of sanitation in the camps, refugees presented an ideal 
target for disease eradication. Mobile health teams visited the camps and administered 
vaccinations, rising from 4.1 million nationwide vaccinations in 1964 to 27.8 million in 1968.55 
However, as Warwick Anderson notes, immunization programs do not give states the same 
UHJXODWRU\SRZHURYHUFLWL]HQV¶ERGLHVDVFDPSDLJQVRIK\JLHQLFUHIRUP$VWDWHFDQLPPXQize 
its people but they would not become modern, disciplined citizens until they began to follow 
modern hygiene and sanitation practices.56 The RVN Ministry of Health noted that immunization 
HIIRUWVZHUH³OHVVLPSRUWDQW´WKDQHQYLURQPHQWDOVDQLWDWLRQDQGKealth education for the very 
reason that immunization GLGQRWUHTXLUH³WKHVXSSRUWRIWKHSRSXODWLRQ.´3RSXODUDFFHSWDQFHRI
environmental sanitation and health education, unlike immunization, provided a yardstick by 
which government officials could measure rural political identities and acceptance of the 
government more generally.57  
With the relatively improved security in the countryside after 1968, the government 
encouraged and incentivized urban-dwelling peasants and refugees to return to rural areas. As 
USAID director John Hannah implied, these refugees were not part of a national political 
community. The goal of the µReturn-to-Village¶ (RTV) program+DQQDKVDLGZDV³WRPRYH
 
54 Gregory A. Daddis, :HVWPRUHODQG¶V:DU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these war victims out of the status of refugees and back into the status of normal citizenship.´58 
By combining the RTV program with community development, the Director of the U.S. 
PLVVLRQ¶V5HIXJHH'LUHFWRUDWH William Hitchcock claimed, the program would transform 
UHIXJHHVLQWR³viable and willing members of an essentially participant society.´59 The 
rehabilitation of the refugee and war victim population, it seems, not only included efforts to 
bring them back into the community of productive workers and loyal government supporters, but 
also included more sanitary habits to regulate behavior in new communities. In 1971, the 
government decided to establish sanitary hamlets at all RTV and resettlement sites. The RVN 
combined refugee resettlement with the Sanitary Hamlet Program to shape a new rural citizenry. 
By encouraging de-urbanization, community development, and hygienic reform, government 
planners were expressing a vision of rural modernity which tied hygiene and sanitation to 
political stability.  
Mobile health teams visited the refugee groups targeted for resettlement, screening them 
for TB, dysentery, parasites, and skin conditions, treating suspected cases and immunizing 
others:KHQWKHWHDPVGHWHFWHGPDODULDWKH\FDUULHGRXW³DUDGLFDORQH-day treatment´RIthe 
entire group and in instances of infestation, the teams conducted thorough delousing. The target 
JURXSZDVWKHQVXEMHFWHGWRWZRZHHN¶VLQWHQVLYHKHDOWK education with health workers 
employing loudspeakers, leaflets, films, and demonstrations. Finally, within the new 
communities, under the supervision of government cadres and American advisers, the resettled 
refugees constructed new sanitary facilities. Following the establishment of the new, sanitized 
 
58 ³Testimony of John Hannah (Administrator, Agency for International Development)´ Hearings Before the 
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settlementsUXUDOKHDOWKWHDPVPDGHSHULRGLFYLVLWVWRFRQGXFWKHDOWKHGXFDWLRQ³RQDORZHUOHYHO
RILQWHQVLW\´WKDQGXULQJWKHLQLWLDOtwo week-long saturation.60 Such education sought to 
transform a rural culture in the shortest possible time, allowing the state to retreat from health 
care responsibilities. As the 591¶V1972-1975 Four Year Economic Plan stated, health 
education would produce ³DVHOI-reliant public health system´61 Once educated, a self-regulating 
citizenry would have minimal health care needs, would be productive members of the 
community, and would therefore place less of a burden on precious state resources.  
Subjecting refugees to the sanitary hamlet program, the government and its U.S. advisors 
targeted displaced people, often living in unsanitary, overcrowded camps, immunized them and 
educated them about preventing illness, before sending them back to clean villages. The idea was 
that the refugees would return to their villages healthier, more productive, and more dedicated to 
the anti-Communist cause. Camps therefore served as training grounds for a new form of 
citizenship. The refugees, one assumes, must have wondered why, if sanitation was so important, 
were the camps and reception centers so filthy. Even in the case of the non-refugee population 
the program was, for a government that had previously done little in the medical sphere to reach 
them, an ambitious intervention in the lives of the people, with the state reaching right inside 
SHDVDQW¶VKRPHV 
In this sense, the Sanitary Hamlet Program also reflected and reinforced international 
GHYHORSPHQW¶VJHQGHUHGDQG(XURFHQWULFDVVXPSWLRQV about male productivity and female 
UHSURGXFWLRQEXWDOVRZRPHQ¶VUROHLQKRPHPDNLQJDQGK\JLHQH7KHWKHRUHWLFDOGHYHORSPHQW
OLWHUDWXUHRIWKHVDQGVUDUHO\GLVFXVVHGZRPHQ¶s role in economic development, but 
 
60 ³*915HIXJHH5HVHWWOHPHQW3ODQ´$XJXVW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projects like the Sanitary Hamlet Program did target their role in the home.62 These gendered 
assumptions seemed particularly misplaced in wartime Vietnam. While Vietnamese women had 
always been involved in agricultural labor, by the early 1970s the war had drained male labor off 
the land and women were increasingly responsible for farm work. Government surveys of 
several villages in Ben Tre province in 1971 revealed that between 60-77% of agricultural 
workers between the ages of sixteen and sixty were women.63 Despite this, or perhaps because of 
the demands agriculture placed on female labor at the expense of homemaking, many 
development projects attempted to foster female domesticity and assigned women a role in 
rescuing their families from what development workers perceived as ill-health, squalor, and 
offensive surroundings. 
The Sanitary Hamlet Program was the most sustained effort in a line of projects targeting 
ZRPHQ¶VUROHLQK\JLHQLFUHIRUPBeginning in the 1950s, female home economics agents with 
WKH591¶V1DWLRQDO$JULFXOWXUDO([WHQVLon Service met with village women in their homes to 
discuss personal hygiene, sanitation, childcare, and nutrition. They also offered tips in how to 
FUHDWH³ZHOO-arranged, convenient, well-YHQWLODWHGDQGDWWUDFWLYHKRPHV´*LUOVZHUHGUDIWHGLQWR
4-T ClubV9LHWQDP¶VHTXLYDOHQWRIWKH-H rural youth clubs that began in the United States in 
the early 20th Century and were exported to dozens of countries in the early Cold War.64 As 
Gabriel Rosenburg has argued, the 4-H clubs reinforced a gendered division of rural labor, in 
which boys focused on revenue production and girls focused on household management and 
beautification. In Vietnam, while a small number of girls joined boys working on crop 
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improvement and livestock projects, home economics agents led all-female 4-T home 
improvement clubs, focusing entirely nutrition, food preparation, and sewing.65 
The new sanitary hamlets also served as a target of intervention for the Community 
Health and Population Studies (CHAPS) program, conceived by USAID as a means of 
surreptitiously spreading information about family planning at the village level. A French 
colonial era law prohibiting contraception remained on the statute books in South Vietnam and 
while MOH officials and civil society groups lobbied resistant legislators to overturn the law, the 
government adopted a permissive attitude to the issue. The CHAPS program trained workers to 
live with peasant families and stimulate competition in household improvement within villages. 
Many of the urban-dwelling workers ³had never imagined the complete disorder and lack of 
even rudimentary sanitary facilities thDWSUHYDLOLQWKHSHDVDQWKRPH´ Indicating the importance 
of aesthetics and sense of propriety to American and urban Vietnamese biopolitical reforms, 
workers also encouraged families to put up a curtain separating sanitary facilities from the rest of 
the home, which would hopefully in time be succeeded by a separate, tiled room. These changes 
could only be implemented within the economic means of each family, providing an opportunity 
for CHAPS workers to inform villagers that fewer children would mean more money to invest in 
WKHIDPLO\¶VKHDOWK. The workers were soon phased out and replaced by local leaders, including 
village midwives who were deemed to have readiest access to the home. The program was also 
scaled up from the home, to the marketplace, schools, and local government buildings. One 
village leader noted that the program had instilled sufficient civic pride in his village that local 
farmers had stopped spitting on the floor of the town hall. As the Sanitary Hamlet Program took 
 
65 Gabriel N. Rosenberg, The 4-H Harvest: Sexuality and the State in Rural America (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2016); ³4-T Programs in Vietnam, 1955-1970´ March 21, 1970, Box 6, End of Tour Report - 
ADM (1-3)-1970, MACV, HQ CORDS, MR4/New File Dev Div, Agr Br, RG472, NARA-II. 
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off, sanitarians and health educators working on the project also received CHAPS training in 
family planning promotion techniques.66 
Like so many counterinsurgency schemes in Vietnam, the gap between design and 
practice was one of the primary shortcoming of the sanitary hamlets. In 1971, the MOH ordered 
each provincial health service to select three model hamlets which would act as beacons of 
hygiene for surrounding hamlets to replicate through the Village Self-Development program. 
Each province received VN$100,000 (US$850) for each of the three hamlets. Cadres would then 
mobilize the local population in the construction of sanitary facilities, which MOH officials 
estimated would take 30-45 days.67 In practice, the government and U.S. advisers poured 
resources into some model hamlets that others could not hope to receive, while construction 
projects often took several months to complete. The hamlet of Ong Huong near Bien Hoa 
provides an illustrative example.  
The government chose Ong Huong as a model because of its size, population of over 
2,000 people and proximity to water sources. The project began with U.S. advisers providing 
transport for 100 students to assist 2QJ+XRQJ¶VUHVLGHQWV³LQDEHDXWLILFDWLRQHIIRUW.´These 
advisers then helped residents construct 100 garbage pits, 20 animal pens, and 113 water-sealed 
latrines at a total of 1,500 man hours. They built a dam, which twice washed out before a 
permanent structure was built, and a slow-sand filter to treat raw water into potable water. The 
ODWWHUZDVD³PDMRUXQGHUWDNLQJ´ZKich required well over 2,000 man hours and the assistance of 
the local Popular Forces platoon. Local carpenters and laborers, with U.S. engineers overseeing 
 
66 ³Community Health and Population Studies Workers´ July 1, 1970, Box 14, Pacification Plan 1970, MACV, HQ 
CORDS, MR4/New File Dev Div, Agr Br, RG472, NARA-II. 
67 ³9Y&DS.LQK3KLGH;X'XQJYDR9LHF7KLHW/DSFDF$S9H6LQK´>)LQDQFHIRUXVHLQWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRI
6DQLWDU\+DPOHWV¶@)HEUXDU\ 13, 1971, Folder 2098, Bo Y Te77/74*,,³*915HIXJHH5HVHWWOHPHQW3ODQ´³7\
Y Te Kontum- Ke Hoach Lap Ap Ve 6LQK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the task, took 5 months to build a water tower with a 5,000-gallon tank mounted on top. The 
water was treated with calcium hypochlorite and the villagers installed two diesel pumps. The 
U.S. unit responsible for aiding the project reported that water-borne communicable diseases 
would be eliminated from the hamlet and that the SRWDEOHZDWHUVXSSO\³KDVHncouraged the local 
populace to continue good sanitation habits.´68  
For the Ministry of Health, health education had the power for the wholesale 
transformation of rural society. The Sanitary Hamlet program was not just a model for better 
health in the countryside but the first step toward rural modernization in all areas. MOH planners 
noted that the program provided a model for other government ministries in the same way that 
the sanitary hamlets provided a model for unsanitary hamlets. As the model hamlets proliferated, 
all hamlets would become sanitized. The next step would be an Agricultural Hamlet in which 
IDUPLQJPHWKRGVZRXOGEHPRGHUQL]HGIROORZHGE\(GXFDWLRQ+DPOHWVDLPHGDW³H[SDQGLQJ
culture.´69 
Ong Huong hamlet served as one of these showcases; public health officials visited the 
hamlet to see the latrines, wells, and slow sand filter.70 The idea was that residents of 
surrounding hamlets would be so inspired that they would vote to implement projects to sanitize 
their own hamlets through the Village Self-Development fund. But the total cost of the Ong 
Huong project was VN$350,000 plus the donation of surplus American supplies and well over 
3,500 man hours. U.S. engineers estimated that a slow sand filter could cost up to VN$1,115,000 
 
68 ³0$&9&25'6$GYLVRU\7HDP$FFRPSOLVKPHQWV,´0D\ 13, 1972, Civil Operations and Rural Development 
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including material and labor.71 Surrounding hamlets, inspired by beautified Ong Huong, would 
therefore be hard pressed to match this effort. Under the VSD program the government 
contributed VN$1,000,000 to every village which held elections but these funds, in principle, 
had to be shared among several hamlets. 
Throughout the war, Americans and their South Vietnamese counterparts developed a 
series of surveys to measure the impact of pacification programs on the political identities of the 
population. As RQH&,$UHSRUWVWDWHG³WKLVLVDOPRVWLPSRVVLEOH´72 When it came to the sanitary 
hamlets, however, U.S. personnel discovered a way to measure the more quantifiable benefits of 
the program. The primary indicator of whether sanitation had improved in the newly upgraded 
hamlets was to measure the level of intestinal parasites in the local population before and after 
sanitary improvements had been made. Americans were assisted in this task by members of the 
Korean Preventive Medicine (KOPREM) team for whom the war in Vietnam provided a useful 
WUDLQLQJJURXQGIRU6RXWK.RUHD¶VRZQEDWWOHDJDLQVWSDUDVLWHV Having not long ago been subject 
WRRWKHULQJLQ9LHWQDPWKH.235(0PHPEHUVHQFRXQWHUHGVRPH³XQEHOievably strange 
FXVWRPV´DPRQJUXUDO9LHWQDPHVH73 In Military Region III, KOPREM members, as well as the 
Parasitology Department of the U.S. 9th Medical Laboratory provided diagnostic services for 
parasitic diseases, collecting water and fecal samples and taking them back to the lab where they 
determined the levels of parasitic infection in the newly sanitized villagers.74 Rather than being a 
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SURJUDPWKDW³UHDFKHVLQWRWKH very KHDUWRIWKHKDPOHWV´DVone senior U.S. adviser claimed, it 
was in fact a program that reached into the bowels of the hamlet.75 Almost 60 years earlier, 
during a cholera outbreak in the Philippines, American scientist E.L. Munson had conceded that 
$PHULFDQIHFHVFROOHFWLRQDPRXQWHGWR³DQLQYDVLRQRIWKHDFFHSWHGULJKWVRIWKHKRPHDQGRI
the individual on a scale perhaps unprecedHQWHGIRUDQ\FRPPXQLW\´76 If modern sanitation 
meant the rather humiliating process of foreigners coming into your home and inspecting the 
contents of your new toilet, one can imagine that at least some peasants were not terribly 
enthused about the program. Some newly sanitized villagers simply expressed amusement, 
³HYHU\WKUHHGD\VRUVR´RQHVDLG³WKHUHLVDJURXSRI$PHULFDQVZKRFRPHWRVHHWKHWRLOHWV.´77  
The sanitary hamlet program aimed to abolish existing hygienic practices and force the 
peasantry to modernize. As a corollary, the villagers, seeing visible improvements in their 
standard of living could be more easily co-opted into the JRYHUQPHQW¶V support base. But the 
evidence suggests it was not so easy to transform a rural culture and peasants did not always 
respond as the government hoped. In Buu Son district in the central coastal province of Ninh 
Thuan, the provincial health services had to abandon attempts to establish a sanitary hamlet at 
Dac Nhon because the people had failed to respond satisfactorily WRWKHFDGUHV¶exhortations to 
sanitize themselves.78 If the residents of one of the three hamlets that the provincial services had 
identified as a potential model site did not embrace the program, it did not bode well for those 
hamlets which were supposed to voluntarily adopt MOH guidelines. Even where the government 
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was able to establish sanitary hamlets, there were practical reasons as to why the villagers did not 
DOZD\VPHHWWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VH[SHFWDWLRQV The toilets, mused a resident of one of the newly 
sanitized model hamletsZHUH³JRRGDWQLJKWEXWLQWKHGD\WLPH´ZKHQpeople were working 
they ³still prefer the rice fields or the river bDQNV´79 As a result of the population relocation 
which had made the construction of the sanitary hamlets possible, many peasants now lived 
kilometers from their fields; they were therefore unlikely to venture home to relieve themselves. 
Further evidence indicated that villagers may have accepted the sanitary upgrade but the true 
focus of their concerns lay elsewhere. The village councils in three adjoining villages in Chau 
Doc province used the occasion of a sanitary hamlet dedication ceremony to pass a petition to a 
U.S. public health worker. Addressed to the RVN President, Prime Minister, and the National 
Assembly, the petition made no mention of the recent sanitary improvements. Instead, the 
councils requested that the government dredge the local Vinh An Ha canal. Such an action would 
improve livelihoods of 30,000 people by boosting agricultural production and transportation. 
These village leaders also appeared to turn the language of sanitation against the government, 
QRWLQJWKDWWKHVKDOORZDQGGU\FDQDOPHDQWWKHSHRSOH¶V³HDWLQJDQGGULQNLQJ>DUH@XQVDQLWDU\.´80 
The model sanitary hamlets cost significantly more than the government was capable of 
contributing elsewhere. With the expectation that neighboring hamlets would replicate these 
construction efforts, the MOH was holding those peasants to standards of hygiene with which 
they were previously unfamiliar and that their economic status did not allow them to achieve and 
maintain. Even within the model sanitary hamlets there were problems. The government 
expected these villagers to maintain certain levels of hygiene and sanitation but rather than 
 
79 (PHUVRQ³9LHWQDP+DPOHWD6DQLWDU\0RGHO´. 
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encouraging self-sufficiency, the government had built complex sanitation works such as slow 
sand filters which the villagers could not maintain without government assistance. Some U.S. 
advisers complained that there was an overemphasis on the physical infrastructure of the hamlets 
to the detriment of continuous health education, evidence perhaps that the aesthetics of the 
project were more important than disease prevention.81 But it was also the case that manpower 
and resources for maintenance and health education remained critically deficient. 
By the end of 1971, there were 141 sanitary hamlets throughout the country and the 
02+SODQQHGRQHKDPOHWDQGRQHIXOO\VDQLWL]HGYLOODJHLQHDFKRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VGLVWULFWVE\
the end of 1973.82 There was some skepticism among foreign advisers as to whether the RVN 
could sustain the effort. For KOPREM leaders, who had wrapped up their mission in 1970, 
Vietnam had revealed the limits of health education in rural Asia and, in part due to this 
H[SHULHQFHPHGLFDOWUHDWPHQWEHFDPHWKH6RXWK.RUHDQVWDWH¶VSUHIHUUHGPHWKRGIRUGHDOLQJ
with parasitic infection at home.83 American officials were somewhat more optimistic, though 
believed there was a need for continued tutelage. In Congressional testimony in April 1972 
5REHUW1RRWHURI86$,'VDLGSUHYHQWLYHKHDOWKFDUHZDV³QHZWR[the South Vietnamese]. I 
hesitate to say they are ready WRWDNHRYHUWKDWZKROHILHOG´EXWWKH6DQLWDU\+DPOHW3URJUDPZDV
DWOHDVWLQGLFDWLYHRIWKH*91¶VDWWHPSWWRIRFXVRQORQJ-range planning.84 On the ground, 
$PHULFDQRIILFLDOVH[SUHVVHGVLPLODUVHQWLPHQWV³,WZRXOGEHXQUHDOLVWLFWRDVVXPHWKDWWKH
VietnDPHVHDUHSUHSDUHG«WRWDNHRYHUDQGHIIHFWLYHO\RSHUDWHWKHLURZQSURJUDPVLQWKLVILHOG´
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noted one senior adviser.85 It seemed to John Ely, the director of U.S. public health efforts in 
0LOLWDU\5HJLRQ,9WKDWHGXFDWHG9LHWQDPHVHXQGHUVWRRGWKHQHHGIRUSRWDEOHZDWHUEXW³WKH
FKDQFHVRIPRWLYDWLQJWKHKDPOHWSHDVDQWWRWUHDWKLVGULQNLQJZDWHUDUHYHU\VOLP´,WZRXOGbe 
better to concentrate on educating first graders in the hope that the next generation would have 
³VXIILFLHQWNQRZOHGJH´7KH9LHWQDPHVHZRXOG³QHHGFRQWLQXLQJDGYLFH«IRUPDQ\\HDUVWR
FRPH´86 By 1975, the total number of sanitary hamlets had risen to 275, many of which had 
more than 1,000 residents. However, in the final analysis, USAID ruled the sanitary hamlets a 
³FUDVKSURJUDP´ZKLFKVHUYHGQRORQJ-term value. The peasantry was apparently interested and 
keen to dedicate time to completing projects but given the dearth of sanitary agents and health 
HGXFDWLRQRIILFHUV³WKHSHRSOHVRRQUHYHUWHGWRWKHLUROGKDELWV´87 
 
Conclusion 
Despite the deliberate hyperbole of his 1961 speech, Che Guevara had a valid critique of 
American developmentalism in the 20th Century. Toilet-building was a significant feature of U.S. 
SODQVIRUWKHPRGHUQL]DWLRQRI³EDFNZDUG´SDUWVRIWKHZRUOG$FURVVWLPHDQGVSDFH$PHULFDQ
toilet-building projects followed a similar logic, performed similar functions, and shared certain 
discursive continuities. The absence of adequate sanitary facilities singled out populations for 
sanitary reform and such interventions would, it was anticipated, create new political identities. 
Reformers therefore presented unsanitary populations with paradigmatic examples of sanitary 
infrastructure and behavior, in the hope that this would produce a ripple effect. Nonetheless, one 
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must conclude that these efforts were largely performative. The unsanitary Other was presented 
ZLWKWKHERXQWLHVRIPRGHUQLW\EXWWKHRQXVZDVRQWKHPWRXSKROGUHIRUPHUV¶VWDQGDUGV,W
should have come as little surprise then, that the targets of reform were never quite capable of 
PHHWLQJUHIRUPHUV¶H[SHFWDWLRQV 
These projects suggest that U.S. approaches to international development after 1945 
might not be so neatly split off from the late colonial, civilizing mission. Although the horror of 
the Holocaust, the imperatives of Cold War competition with the Soviet Union in the Third 
World, and the moral power of the black freedom movement at home, produced a postwar racial 
OLEHUDOLVPWKDWZRXOGQRORQJHUGHQ\7KLUG:RUOGSHRSOH¶VFDSDFLW\IRUVHOI-government and 
would temper explicitly racist statements, development projects informed by this racial 
liberalism still adopted an assimilationist and paternalist attitude to foreign peoples. We perhaps 
see this more clearly if we look beyond the rhetoric of modernization to on-the-ground practices 
such as toilet-building. While the postwar discourse of international development may not have 
drawn on the biological determinism of earlier eras and was noticeably less bigoted, practical 
approaches to development on the ground still placed people in a racialized hierarchy based on 
what were imagined to be culturally determined behaviors. From the colonial Philippines to 
postcolonial Vietnam, sanitary behavior served as one way of exceptionalizing difference and 
creating hierarchies among populations. Open defecation remained a barrier to the attainment of 
American standards of civilization. These racialized perceptions produced a tension. On the one 
hand, Americans expressed disgust at the assumed inability or refusal of the Other to defecate 
appropriately. On the other hand, was compulsion to transform the sanitary habits of the Other, 
often in the service of larger pacification goals and despite the uncertainties about the likelihood 
of success. 
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The United States found willing partners in the colonial and postcolonial elite who 
viewed the modernization of their backward populations as essential to independence and 
economic development. Hygiene was one of the most obvious ways in which the postcolonial 
elite could distinguish itself from the masses, deliver the fruits of modernity, and legitimize its 
rule. In the case of South Vietnam, political leaders had a vision of rural society based on their 
reading of the precolonial village, but elite discourse on sanitary behavior in the countryside 
echoed colonial attitudes to the peasantry and RVN rural health programs reflected colonial 
premises about the relationship between hygiene, discipline, and political stability. These 
findings compel us to reconceptualize the RVN, not simply as an appendage of the United States 
but a product of Vietnamese history and actor of significance in the war.  
 It is perhaps too soon to draw a line under such activities. In 2007, reports emerged that 
$IJKDQQDWLRQDOVZRUNLQJRQ1$72¶V.DQGDKDU$LU%DVHZHUHUHTXLUHGWRXVHVHSDUDWHWRLOHWVWR
those used by NATO forces. U.S. oIILFHU/W&RO-DFN%OHYLQVH[SODLQHG³LW¶VQRWEDVHGRQD
UDFLDOWKLQJLW¶VMXVWKRZWKH\XVHWRLOHWV7KH\¶UHQRWXVHGWRWRLOHWV7KH\XVHVTXDWVRUKROHVLQ
WKHJURXQG«:KHQWKH\XVHRXUSRUW-a-potties, they stand on the seats and it causes quite a 
mess.´0HDQZKLOHLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ¶VUXUDOSURYLQFHV86$,'DQGRWKHUGRQRUDJHQFLHV
alongside the Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, launched ambitious 
SODQVIRU³FRPPXQLW\-OHGWRWDOVDQLWDWLRQ´3URMHFWVDLPHGWRFKDQJHORFDOVDQLWDWion habits, 
LQFOXGLQJHQFRXUDJLQJFRPPXQLW\PHPEHUVWR³SUHVVXUHRQHDQRWKHUWRPDLQWDLQVDIHKDELWV.´,Q
an indication that U.S. aid agencies continued to face the same challenges that had beset earlier 
efforts, project designers noted that practitioners should not measure success simply in terms of 
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WRLOHWVEXLOW5DWKHUWKHIRFXVVKRXOGEHRQ³WKHXVHDQGPDLQWHQDQFHRIODWULQHV´ZKLFKOHad to 
measurable health improvements.88  
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